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On July 4th, 2017, the New York Times reported that over
one hundred Iraqi-origin Christians in the Detroit area
were facing deportation under the Trump administration’s
“national clampdown on illegal immigration” (Yee 2017).
Having entered the United States legally, these Chaldean
Christians had had their green cards revoked after crimi-
nal convictions rendered them “criminal aliens” in the
eyes of the state. Despite their sentences having been
served years prior to the clampdown, Iraq’s unwillingness
to issue the men with travel documents had resulted in
their de facto tolerance as residents of the United States.
All this changed, however, when President Donald Trump
came to power. In exchange for being dropped from the
list of (so-called) “Muslim-majority” countries affected by
the new administration’s travel ban, Iraq agreed to accept
deportees from the United States. Three months later, 114
Iraqi men in the Detroit suburbs awoke to find immigra-
tion agents on their doorsteps.
In a context of rising anti-immigrant sentiment in the
United States (and elsewhere), the targeting of these men
by the authorities might appear unsurprising. After all, a
President who had won support by calling for “a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”
and who continues to advocate for the building of a “big,
beautiful wall” to deter irregular migration on the coun-
try’s southern border is an unlikely advocate for those
deemed “criminal aliens.”
For the men themselves, however, the fact that they
were caught in the dragnet came as a shock. Many of
those affected had backed Trump’s campaign, supporting
not only his conservative stance on issues such as abor-
tion, but his commitment, as they understood it, to reli-
gious minorities in their country of origin. In January
2017, for example, Trump had tweeted “Christians in the
Middle-East have been executed in large numbers. We
cannot allow this horror to continue!” Indeed, it was anxi-
ety over their minority status that had led many of these
Chaldean Christians to leave Iraq decades earlier. Soon
after the deportation raids, the Times reports, “a local
Chaldean noted the disconnect between tweet and deed.
‘Then why are you deporting them?’ he wrote on Twitter,
bracketing the question with a snarl of English, Aramaic
and Arabic that would be unprintable in any language”
(Yee 2017).
Given the contemporary salience of religious identity
politics (and identity-based policing), this anger is under-
standable. “Persecuted religious minorities,” and the osten-
sibly unique challenges they face, have never been so
high-profile. Nor have efforts to “protect” such vulnerable
persons through legal instruments designed to recognize
and uphold their right to religious freedom. As the leader
of a nation committed to Madison’s first freedom—
“Nowhere, as Americans understand it, is religion so
strong and so free” (Sullivan 2005, 1)—Trump’s failure to
safeguard the rights of a religious minority (and particu-
larly a Christian minority) struck many as indefensible
(Zlatopolsky 2017; Jackson 2017).
Protections for religious liberty have long been
enshrined in national and international law. Alongside
domestic provisions such as the United States’ First
Amendment, multilateral instruments such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the European Convention
on Human Rights all affirm the importance of freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion. That signatories to these
treaties are often unwilling or unable to protect religious lib-
erty in practice is typically read as a failure on the part of
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national governments, not a fundamental problem with the
idea of the right itself. The citizen’s right to religious
freedom is, it seems, equal parts assumption and product of
the liberal democratic order.
But as the media outcry over the plight of the
Chaldeans shows, religious freedom is not solely a domes-
tic concern. A state’s duty to promote free religion no lon-
ger stops at the border. The United States’ International
Religious Freedom Act (1998), for example, codifies the
promotion of religious liberty as a central aim of American
diplomacy, while 2016 saw the appointment of the first
European Union Special Envoy for the promotion of free-
dom of religion or belief outside of the EU (European
Commission 2016). This suggests, as Winnifred Fallers
Sullivan, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood, and
Peter G. Danchin argue in their introduction to Politics of
Religious Freedom, that “[i]n a remarkably short period,
religious freedom has been naturalized in public discourse
worldwide as an indispensable condition for peace in our
time, advocated across the world and across the religious
and political spectrum” (1).
What are the practical outcomes of these efforts to
promote religious liberty through foreign policy? How
should scholars of religion understand the coterminous
rise of “religious freedom talk” (Wenger, Religious Free-
dom: The Contested History of an American Ideal) and state-
sanctioned hostility towards minority groups, such as
Detroit’s Chaldeans? This review article discusses a num-
ber of important titles in this burgeoning field of study,
focusing on the relationship between and the results of
both contemporary and historic efforts to “export” freedom
of religion. For the authors of the books under review,
internationalized “religious freedom talk” has complex and
contradictory outcomes that are difficult to separate from
the logic and politics of empire; and yet, in a context of
markedly unequal power relations, the language of reli-
gious liberty can also be creatively instrumentalized by
marginalized groups.
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s much discussed Beyond Reli-
gious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion forms a
crucial part of this debate. A staunch critic of both the
assumptions behind and the results of the desire to harness
and remake religion in the service of Euro-American inter-
ests, Hurd argues that policies seeking to manage sectarian
disputes are as likely to fuel violence as to quell it. This is
due, in large part, to the understanding of “religion” mobi-
lized by governments and NGOs in their efforts to promote
religious liberty. By approaching religion as “an isolable
entity and causal powerhouse,” such policies posit it as
either “good” or “bad”—“moderate” or “fanatical”—and
thus the target of either promotion or suppression (2–4).
This Manichean vision cannot account for the messiness of
religion as it is “lived,” that is, religion as it is “entangled in
all domains of human life, forms of belonging, work, play,
governance, violence, and exchange” (7). Instead, it privi-
leges religion as a site of difference that transcends the
political and historical realities inhabited by flesh and blood
human beings, transforming complex persons into repre-
sentatives of isolable, coherent religious traditions. This ten-
dency to classify (and then govern) groups according to
their presumed religion (or non-religion) works to highlight
tension rather than subdue it, ultimately “[diminishing]
the possibility of crosscutting, non-sectarian forms of
politics” (42).
Beyond Religious Freedom is inspired, in part, by
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan’s seminal work in the field of
law and religion. Sullivan’s The Impossibility of Religious
Freedom (2005), which provides a fine-grained ethno-
graphic account of a First Amendment “free exercise”
case, highlighted the difficulties involved in defining reli-
gion for the purposes of law. “Legal religion,” Impossibility
argued, might bear only a fleeting resemblance to its lived
counterpart. While Sullivan’s work focuses on the United
States, Hurd takes this domestic argument and applies it
to international affairs. To this end, she distinguishes
between three heuristics: “expert religion,” “governed reli-
gion,” and “lived religion.” Expert religion is religion as it
is imagined “by those who generate ‘policy-relevant’
knowledge about religion in various contexts,” including
academics, professional associations, think tanks, security
experts, and so forth. Governed religion is religion as it
imagined by those “in positions of political and religious
power,” such as states, international courts, churches, and
supranational governing bodies such as the European
Union. Lived religion may not fit within the parameters of
either expert or governed religion, although the bound-
aries between the three are porous (8–19). Hurd acknowl-
edges that these categories are “imperfect,” but hopes that
their conceptual differentiation will allow readers to move
beyond a binary understanding of religion in international
affairs, in which it is approached according to such opposi-
tional pairings as “establishment/disestablishment, free-
dom/unfreedom, and separation/accommodation” (9).
Hurd argues that the pursuit of freedom of religion as
a policy goal has worked to produce, reaffirm, and/or reify
various forms of difference, both between Euro-American
nations and the recipients of their cultural imperialism,
and between legally specified religious (and non-religious)
“communities” throughout the world. Chapter 3, for exam-
ple, discusses the harrowing situation facing the Rohingya
people in Myanmar. As with Christians in the South West
Asia and North Africa region, including the Iraqi Chal-
deans reported on by the New York Times, the Rohingya
are typically framed as a religious minority at risk from
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their religious majority neighbors (in this instance, Mus-
lim and Buddhist, respectively). But as Hurd points out,
“the Rohingya are not excluded from Burmese society
exclusively with religious slurs, but also with racist and
other dehumanizing terms” (43). In a context of political
and military instability, the Rohingya are treated as illegal
Bengali migrants, ethnic outsiders, and economic threats.
They are scapegoated by the political class, who stoke
inter-ethnic tensions as a “useful distraction” from the
power struggles occupying the governing elite (43–45).
While religious difference is one aspect of their exclu-
sion, the power attributed to the category of “Muslim minor-
ity” cannot be understood in a vacuum. British colonial
officials, who managed Muslim–Buddhist relations under a
“divide and rule” policy, reified and aggravated the ostensi-
ble differences between these communities as part of their
governing strategy (44). Contemporary Euro-American
depictions of the plight of the Rohingya as “fundamentally
religious in nature” work to reaffirm the problematic notion
that this particular difference is of greater existential weight
than any other. As such, international campaigns to ensure
the Rohingya’s religious freedom play into the hands of
their oppressors: “By reinforcing their status as Muslims
rather than as Burmese citizens or as human beings, lobby-
ing for the religious rights of the Rohingya makes it less
likely that the Burmese government—or the democratizing
monks—will include the Rohingya in Burmese state and
society as citizens and humans, rather than as Muslims”
(46–47). Further, and to go slightly beyond Hurd’s account,
presenting this conflict as the result of a primordial reli-
gious struggle that can only be solved by the exportation of
religious freedom allows Western nations to ignore their
historic role in cementing and politicizing these lines of dif-
ference, thereby absolving Euro-American nations of their
colonial guilt.
Beyond Religious Freedom gives a bird’s eye view of a
global phenomenon, offering a smorgasbord of examples
without fully unpacking their political or historical context.
The book jumps quickly from continent to continent,
discussing, inter alia, Sahrawis in Algeria, the K’iche’ in
Guatemala, Copts in Egypt, Orthodox Christians in Albania,
and Alevis in Turkey. Some examples are explored in pages,
while others are discussed in paragraphs. As such, and
given the sweeping nature of the claims made, the evidence
offered in support of them—while, from the perspective of
this reviewer, highly convincing—remains somewhat
surface-level. This is not necessarily a criticism: manu-
scripts have word limits, and it would be impossible to com-
bine both the international breadth of the thesis with
substantial ethnographic texture. Indeed, the scope of the
argument is the book’s core strength. Readers trained in
participatory research methods, however, may find
themselves calling out for greater ethnographic flesh to be
put on the theoretical bones of Hurd’s work: how do those
affected by policies that reflect “expert” and “governed”
religion understand their situation? How do they resist,
acquiesce, challenge or succumb to the identitarian boxes
into which they have been put?
It is here that the contributions to Politics of Religious
Freedom come to the fore. The result of a collaborative
research project funded by the Henry Luce Foundation, this
edited volume brings together anthropologists, historians,
lawyers, political scientists, and scholars of religion to dis-
cuss (and “unsettle”) the assumption “that religious free-
dom is easily recognized and understood, and that the only
problem lies in its incomplete realization” (2). The collection
is divided into four parts, each of which is prefaced by one
of the four editors: Winnifred Fallers Sullivan on “Religion”;
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd on “History”; Peter G. Danchin on
“Law and Politics”; and Saba Mahmood on “Freedom.” These
introductions usefully contextualize the thematic links
between the essays in each section, each of which contains
an example of the “crazy quilt of local solutions” by which
conflicts over religion are managed (6). Many of the chap-
ters touch upon the historic experience and ongoing effects
of empire, European and otherwise. Given the concerns of
this essay, it is to (a selection of) these contributions that I
now turn.
Waheeda Amien’s chapter, “Postapartheid Treatment
of Religious Freedom in South Africa,” argues that the
South African state’s willingness to tolerate religion in the
public sphere “is a direct result of its discriminatory-laden
history under colonialism and apartheid” (179). In addition
to instituting racial hierarchy, both European colonialists
and the architects of apartheid discriminated on religious
grounds, penalizing non-Christian South Africans for their
supposedly “uncivilized” lifeways. Given this history, the
founders of the fledgling rainbow nation sought to protect
religious freedom as an aspect of “human dignity” (182). It
is for this reason that Section 15(3)(a) of the South African
Constitution permits the enactment of legislation to recog-
nize religious and traditional marriages in law. In the
wake of the new Constitution, African customary marriage
was quickly legislated for. The legal recognition of Muslim
marriages, however, has proved more problematic: while
the Constitution’s “inclusive secularism” ensures religious
freedom, this freedom is not absolute (182). Discussing fif-
teen years’ worth of deliberations over how best to recog-
nize Muslim marriages in law, Amien shows that the
debates have exposed lines of conflict within communities
identified as “Muslim,” bringing together strange bedfel-
lows in their wake. Conservative Shi’a Muslims, for exam-
ple, who are opposed to current proposals on the grounds
that they pay insufficient attention to their tradition, find
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themselves “locking arms” with secularists who favor the
absolute separation of church and state (184). Section 15
(3)(a) was supposed to undo an historic injustice, restoring
to South Africa’s Muslim citizens the dignity and recogni-
tion they were denied under colonialism and apartheid
(183). As Amien’s account shows, however, ongoing efforts
to ensure religious freedom are, at best, an ambiguous cor-
rective to this colonial legacy.
The specter of empire also haunts Noah Salomon’s
essay, “Freeing Religion at the Birth of South Sudan.” Salo-
mon begins with a provocative question: if the reader were
to find herself the founder of a new nation, how would she
choose to manage the relationship between church and
state? “While such a scenario may seem like a far-fetched
fantasy, [this was the question] many South Sudanese
were asking themselves in the summer of 2011, elated at
the possibility of starting anew after a history of brutal
civil war and colonial (African and European) occupation”
(280). If the situation offered possibilities, it also offered
challenges. This was particularly the case for South Suda-
nese Muslims, who—despite violent efforts on the part of
British colonialists to prevent the spread of Islam from
north to south—“had gone from being part of a national
majority, to being a ‘minority group’ literally overnight,
and without travelling anywhere” (282).
Drawing on fieldwork carried out in the immediate
aftermath of independence, Salomon argues that the level
of significance to be accorded religious identity/ies (as
opposed to class, regional, or tribal affiliations) had yet to be
determined in the national imaginary. (The possibility of
“-ies” is crucial. As Salomon points out, many South
Sudanese follow multiple traditions, and Muslims, Christi-
ans, and adherents of what the government calls “African
traditional religions” may all live under the same roof.)
While some Muslims emphasized their African (as opposed
to Islamic) credentials, seeking to shape a South Sudanese
Islam distinct from the “cultural stamp of the north,” others
worried that the creation of an explicitly secular South
Sudan might translate into sectarianism (282). Indeed, the
model of secularism trumpeted by the government seemed
to contain a paradox. In the months following independence,
South Sudanese politicians espoused a vision of secularism
modeled on the American ideal of non-establishment, in
which the separation of church and state is thought to guar-
antee freedom of religion. Yet they also “understand the sec-
ular as a historically specific device through which they can
erase a painful and violent past in which the political space
was forcibly ‘Islamized’ through the actions of conquerors
from the north” (286). Salomon’s piece reminds us that,
even for the world’s youngest nation, religious freedom is
always the product of history.
Contributions to Politics of Religious Freedom tend to
highlight the messy, ambiguous, and unstable aspects of
religious freedom as both concept and practice. Its editors
state that they do not take a position “for or against reli-
gious freedom” (2). Yet they also argue that “to continue
to use the word [religion] in law is to invite discrimina-
tion” (7), suggesting that they are, at least, opposed to
efforts to legally protect the category. This possible discon-
nect is indicative of a tension that runs throughout the
scholarship in this area, which seeks to problematize the
assumptions underlying religious freedom even as it is
slow to suggest alternatives. For some readers—and par-
ticularly those whose research is supplemented with
“practice”—the failure to offer “policy solutions” might
appear as an abdication of responsibility on the part of
seasoned scholars. For those wary of the normative assess-
ments of interventionist academics, however, this may be
the only approach available to the responsible scholar.
Regardless of one’s position, I suggest, the tension
remains: given the simultaneous existence of and prob-
lems with these legal instruments, how should critical
scholars proceed? Is it possible to flag up a concept’s
ambiguities without being accused of declaring religious
freedom “bad” (Lloyd 2016)?
Tisa Wenger’s Religious Freedom: The Contested History
of an American Ideal does an admirable job of navigating
this line. Wenger explicitly engages with the question of
American imperialism, “[retelling] the story of American
religious freedom as an illuminating lens into the intersec-
tions of race, religion, and empire in US history” (1). A
work of historical scholarship, Religious Freedom focuses
on the decades between the Spanish-Cuban-Filipino-
American War of 1898 and the outbreak of the Second
World War, a period Wenger suggests has been under-
examined by scholars of religious freedom. Yet “[i]t turns
out that Americans of every description—and with them
many unwilling subjects of U.S. empire—appealed to reli-
gious freedom for all sorts of purposes in this period” (11).
Wenger traces the complex—and sometimes contradic-
tory—deployment of “religious freedom talk” over these
four decades, arguing that although references to religious
liberty served, in most respects, to frame the American
nation as white, Protestant, and secular, they also offered
avenues of resistance for the many marginalized groups
who existed outside of these categories.
Drawing on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari, Wenger treats identitarian categories such as
race, gender, sexuality, class, and religion as both “inter-
locking assemblages” and aspects of “civilizational
assemblages,” by which she means “the complex interplay
of ideological and institutional processes that work
together to define who and what counts as civilized and
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thus as fully human—and by contrast, who and what does
not” (3). Assemblages may involve the interplay of individ-
ual creativity, dominant ideology, and material factors in
the designation of in- and out-group identity, meaning that
although they “shape the life prospects, perspectives, and
experiences of everyone they touch,” they are also open to
contestation (3). While racial and religious assemblages
are critical to the story told in Religious Freedom, perhaps
the most important civilizational assemblage to which she
refers is that of empire. Her emphasis on empire is partic-
ularly important given an ongoing unwillingness, on the
part of policymakers and the broader American public, to
acknowledge the United States as an imperial power. Yet,
just as “freedom had little meaning without the figure of
the slave,” Wenger convincingly shows that the rhetorics
of liberty upon which religious freedom talk depends
emerged hand in hand with American imperialism: “ideol-
ogies of freedom . . . [worked] powerfully as a rationale for
imperial conquest, grounding assertions for this empire as
a benevolent one, uniquely designed to bestow the bless-
ings of freedom, democracy, and civilization” (5). Wenger
provides a powerful rebuke to those who would take
Donald Rumsfeld at his word when he declared “we don’t
do empire” (cf. Brown 2004, 460).
While other work in this field can present a somewhat
hegemonic picture of state power, Wenger showcases the
capacity for resistance contained within “religious freedom
talk.” In her account, even government employees and rep-
resentatives of the state use the language of religious lib-
erty to challenge, destabilize, or undermine the goals of
the powers that be. This is evident in the book’s third
chapter, “Making Religion on the Reservation,” which
builds on Wenger’s (2009) earlier research on settler-
colonial efforts to suppress Native American ceremonial
dances. Her discussion of the Ghost Dance—a movement
based on the prophetic revelations of a Paiute prophet
named Wovoka, who taught that the performance of a new
dance and adherence to a strict moral code would cause
God to “usher in a new world and restore their dead rela-
tives and the buffalo of the plains to life,” and which “ter-
rified many white Americans” (109)—shows that, while
many government officials rejected the claims that the
Ghost Dance represented a religion (and was therefore
entitled to the privileges of the First Amendment), others
found ways to subvert government decrees precisely on
the grounds of religious liberty. In one such instance, an
interpreter working with an anthropologist explained to
the latter that although the Arapaho people continued to
practice the dance, “That’s something I have never
reported, and I never will.” Despite his status as an
employee of the Board of Indian Affairs, the interpreter
justified his subterfuge according to the logic of the First
Amendment: “It is their religion, and they have a right to
it” (112). Such details highlight the ways in which legal
discourse can subvert—or at least complicate—the domi-
nant racial-religious assemblage, even as the ideological
ascendancy of religious liberty is affirmed by those doing
the subverting. This emphasis on ambiguity, contestation,
and the possibility of resistance is one of the book’s core
strengths.
This is not to suggest that Wenger is a romantic. The
book details the way that religious freedom talk was used
to justify colonial expansion, including by those who had
only recently been accepted as legitimate members of
white American society. When migrant European Catholics
used the language of religious liberty to expand the con-
cept of whiteness, for example, they did so by pushing
racialized Others to the margins: “they identified Catholi-
cism as an all-American religion and implicitly claimed for
Catholics the civilizational status of white Americans,
equipped to manage the non-white subjects of imperial
rule” (17). In other words, Catholics claimed the privileges
of Anglo-Protestant whiteness by expressing their desire
to take part in the brutalities of empire. Nor is Wenger
naïve as to the problems involved in co-opting the lan-
guage of one’s oppressors, noting that minority groups
seeking to avail themselves of First Amendment protec-
tions had little choice but to shape and alter their practi-
ces until they fit dominant notions of appropriate
“religion.” Yet Wenger is unwilling to criticize those who
are forced to make such concessions to strategic essential-
ism, for whom religious liberty has proved (and continues
to prove) “a vitally useful ideal” (14).
Similarly, Anna Su’s Exporting Freedom: Religious Lib-
erty and American Power engages critically with American
imperialism without reducing religious freedom to a “float-
ing signifier” (Asad 2003, 158). As with Wenger’s work,
Exporting Freedom takes an historical approach, albeit with
a longer reach: while both authors begin with the annexa-
tion of the Philippines, Su continues up to the U.S. occupa-
tion of Iraq in 2003. The examples in between—including
the advent of the United Nations and the Universal Declara-
tion, the U.S. occupation of Japan, and the passage of the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998—all illustrate
“the ambitions and the limits of what religious freedom pro-
moted as law by an external power can achieve” (10). The
content of such ambition is key for Su, who is interested in
religious freedom as a value or ideal as much as she is in its
more nefarious uses. Its exportation served both “material
and moral interests,” with “aspirations of political morality”
and “naked national interest” two sides of the same coin
(159). Indeed, in her account, the two cannot be separated:
“Great Power thinking animated [the drafting of the docu-
ments under review], whether as part of an American
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civilizing mission or part of exporting democratic values”
(5). More than political control of periphery territory, it is
this “Great Power thinking” that defines American imperial-
ism in the twentieth century: “a way of seeing the world
from a position of power and acting accordingly. That is
only conceivable within the particular context of unequal
relationships in terms of the availability of various modes of
political action” (5).
The significance of “unequal relationships” and their
impact on relative bargaining power is made clear in
Chapter 4, “Spiritual Disarmament.” Focusing on the
prominence given (an American understanding of) reli-
gious freedom in Japan’s post-war constitution, Su shows
that the U.S. military personnel involved in its drafting
viewed religious liberty—and particularly the separation
of church and state—as essential to the creation of a dem-
ocratic Japan, one “more closely aligned with American
international security goals” (91). Key to this democratiza-
tion process was the dismantling of State Shinto. Since the
late nineteenth century, imperial rites and Shinto rituals
had been “deliberately fused.” By casting State Shinto as a
civil—rather than “religious”—obligation, the Meiji gov-
ernment could require all Japanese persons, regardless of
religion, to participate in an ideology that regarded the
emperor as a deity (98). The idea of emperor worship
proved profoundly uncomfortable for the Americans on
both political and theological grounds: such devotion, they
felt, “bordered on the blasphemous” (92). Thus, despite the
Mastumoto Committee (a national committee on constitu-
tional reform) determining that there was no need to
rewrite the Meiji constitution, American anxieties over the
merging of religion and politics meant that these recom-
mendations did not stand. Taking matters into their own
hands, the U.S. delegation produced a draft constitution
that enshrined the separation of church and state and
stripped the emperor of religious significance. That the
Japanese accepted the new constitution is proof of the
“palpable asymmetry of power” between the two parties:
“The constitutional autocracy of the Meiji order had given
way to a democratic constitutional monarchy. With that
transformation, the American spiritual disarmament of
Japan was complete” (107–08).
As with Wenger’s work, Su highlights the connection
between America’s imperial exploits abroad and ongoing
debates “at home.” Her discussion of the annexation of the
Philippines suggests that disputes over its legitimacy were
as much about (re)negotiating the relationship between
Catholics and Protestants on the mainland as they were
attempts to reconcile the United States’ ostensible commit-
ment to self-government with its newly acquired empire.
Under (Vatican-influenced) Spanish rule, the Philippines
had been off limits to missionaries. American Protestants,
who viewed “the Roman Catholic legacy of Spanish rule as
a defective form of Christianity,” hoped to change this,
“advocating for the imperial turn” and the strict separation
of (Catholic) church and state (14). Congregationalist
leader Josiah Strong, for example, “exhorted his fellow
Americans to accept [their] civilizing mandate” in their
primarily Catholic colonies, while holding up “Romanism”
as one of the “ten perils” threatening Americans at home
(15). Although such sentiments “rankled” American Catho-
lics (17), some of whom suggested that “the war in the
Philippines was generally a war against the church,”
others embraced imperialism as a means of demonstrating
national loyalty (22). Politicians walked a fine line,
attempting to assuage Catholic anxiety without being seen
to endorse the authority of the Vatican.
Similar issues arose regarding the colonial govern-
ment’s negotiations with the Philippines’ non-Catholic pop-
ulations, particularly the Muslim Moros in the South. The
Bates-Kiram Treaty (1899), which recognized both slavery
and polygamy as part of the Moros’ religious practice,
“seemed to contradict the stated raison d’e^tre of the Ameri-
can colonial enterprise, which was the spread of liberty and
progress” (28). This raised uncomfortable questions for a
nation still coming to terms with the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution, and where the Supreme Court
had recently refused to recognize religion as a legitimate
justification for polygamy among Utah’s Latter-Day Saints
(see also Wenger. Religious Freedom, 82–100). The Treaty’s
architects, by contrast, argued that it was through bestow-
ing (a limited amount of) religious freedom on the Moros
that they would eventually be Christianized. In the end, and
although “the guarantees of religious liberty were deployed
in different ways for [the Philippines’] Catholic and Muslim
inhabitants, its grant was always accompanied by the with-
holding of political independence” (34).
Of the books under review, Su’s is, perhaps, the most
optimistic about the emancipatory potential of religious
freedom talk. As she states at the outset, “to recognize the
imperial provenance or the double-edged nature of reli-
gious liberty promotion is not a reason to leave it for
dead” (9). Citing statistics that might make the editors of
Politics of Religious Freedom squirm (“33 percent of 198
countries and territories currently have high levels of reli-
gious hostilities”), she declares that “there is no doubt that
religious freedom presents a genuine and continuing
dilemma in a variety of cultural settings” (9). Su’s willing-
ness to accept these terms sits uncomfortably with the evi-
dence marshalled by the other scholars under review,
who—while certainly not denying that people throughout
the world face violence at the hands of their governments,
peers, and neighbors—have argued that framing such con-
flicts in religious terms may well escalate the very crises
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they seek to prevent. For Su, however, it is by becoming
attuned to the historicity and contingency of religious free-
dom that policymakers might more fruitfully deploy it;
rather than rejecting the promotion of religious liberty out-
right, she seeks to urge greater caution in its use (161–62).
This essay has sought to draw attention to recent
scholarship on the relationship between religious freedom
and the politics of empire. That the contributors to the
books surveyed come from such different scholarly back-
grounds—international relations, history, law, anthropol-
ogy, religious studies—shows the vibrancy of this
emerging field of study. While a brief review cannot hope
to do justice to the subtleties of the works under discus-
sion, a common thread is the ever contested (and ever con-
testable) nature of “religious freedom,” an historical
product that, although shaped by global powers, cannot be
separated from local context. Perhaps it is this interplay of
local and global that explains the plight facing Detroit’s
Chaldeans, whose votes reflected a concern with violence
beyond U.S. borders, but whose immigration status ren-
dered them vulnerable to local ethno-nationalism. Yet their
case, too, reveals the presence of Su’s “aspirations of polit-
ical morality,” the possibility for dissent contained in
Wenger’s “religious freedom talk.” At the time of writing,
the American Civil Liberties Union is fighting the immi-
gration order. Their argument—at least in part—turns on
the importance of religious freedom (ACLU 2017).
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